Ever since the beginning of what is called the Gulf crisis, Western media have constantly shown how the West is resorting to distortions and lies as an unprecedented means to spread its new imperialistic and civilizational hegemony.
Articles such as the one published in the "Herald Tribune" on March 19, 1991 are quite frequent. This article contained a detailed analysis of strategic and military operations conducted against Iraq as part of the land attack. It is reported in the article that in November 1990, that is before the Security Council approval, on 29 November, 1990, of resolution 678, General Norman Schwartzkopf had presented at a meeting with other U.S. army generals the broad lines of the strategy to be applied in attacking Iraq. According to Mr. Schwartzkopf, the aim was to destroy the Iraqi military force and enter the country in order to annihilate all Iraqi fronts.
The same day, still according to the "Herald Tribune," that strategy, known as "Left punch," had received the necessary backing. As I already said, all specialists in prospective and strategic studies were aware of the existence of a number of scenarios which were developed 15 years ago, that is since the 1973 oil crisis. A conflict in the Gulf, via political means (coup d'Etat) or military action was something easily predictable because it was necessary for the United States and its allies to control the Gulf region, not only because it is an oil-rich region, but also to preserve stability and defend obedient Arab Governments.
It will be hard, not to say impossible, to forget the West's systematic recourse to lies during this war, both at governmental level and through the media. It is indeed quite easy to point out a number of glaring contradictions over as short a period as seven months. These contradictions may be found in official statements, including the claim that it was the "liberation of Kuwait and the defense of the United Nations Charter" that prompted Western intervention in the Gulf.
I do not think there have ever been as many inconsistencies in official
statements in such a short period of time. Events in the Gulf considerably
affected the credibility of the West and of Western leaders. The same applies
to the United Nations Secretary General, who proved his inability to manage
the crisis and to use in an appropriate manner the means placed at his
disposal by virtue of the Charter. The basic goal of the United Nations
Organizations is to ensure peace and prevent the outbreak of military conflicts
everywhere, whatever the reasons.
There are so many instances of this loss of credibility that the situation has become frankly ridiculous. Thus, on March 19, 1991, the "Washington Post" indicated that a Commission of Congress had criticized the CIA for the information it circulated with respect to the strength of Iraqi armed forces. According to this Commission the CIA had overestimated by 50% the number of Iraqi troops present in Kuwait on 17 January 1991 (day of the launching of air attacks against Iraq) - these forces did not represent more than 20.000 soldiers.
It is therefore obvious that exaggerated reports such as those presenting Iraq as the fourth military power in the world with potential nuclear capabilities were used for specific purposes. We must stress here that there is a difference between disguising truth through the media, on the one hand, and issuing outright lies, on the other. The former is an occasional exercise whereby erroneous as well as truthful information is spread as part of a media campaign; the latter is different in the sense that it is used to exert pressure on public opinion - American public opinion in this case - in order to instill fear in the people and make them accept savage aggression against Iraq. There are numerous examples which show that untruthfulness has become one of the features of the post-colonial era.
Objective analysis of Iraqi military communiqués would show that most of the information reported was consonant with reality. This applies for instance to the milk factory and civilian shelter that Western press depicted as military targets. Few weeks later, field visits by journalists revealed that they were indeed civilian facilities, just like the Baghdad Museum and other cultural monuments.
Let us set aside, for a while, the Gulf wars and raise, in an objective manner, the question of our credibility vis-à-vis ourselves. Our irresponsibility and lack of perspective coupled with our governments' opportunism are a source of concern about the future of the Islamic world. I have apprehensions about two major Islamic countries - Pakistan and Indonesia - because they have a considerable scientific base and have the means to control nuclear energy in a few years.
What is happening in Iraq clearly shows that the West will not allow
any Islamic country to reach such an advanced stage. The rigging of the
latest elections in Pakistan, shortly before the Gulf war, made it possible
to remove Mrs. Benazir Bhutto from power and replace her by a much more
flexible government. In fact, the first decision made by this new government
was to join the "coalition" by sending troops to Saudi Arabia. Though it
took its cue from the West, Pakistan will still be placed under close surveillance
to prevent it from mastering nuclear technology. The Indian-Pakistani conflict
on Kashmir, which has been on the United Nations agenda for forty years,
may well be used to this end.
I also fear for Indonesia. It is the largest Islamic country in terms of population (160 million inhabitants) and a most important country in terms of scientific and technological capabilities. It has important scientific assets in space research and to a lesser extent in the field of technology and atomic energy. A number of scenarios could be envisaged. There are several oil-rich islands near Indonesia, including Brunei, which is governed by the richest man in the world. We can consider that Indonesia, having historical rights in the region, may be faced with such threats as would compel it to protect itself and defend its territorial integrity. This may well warrant external intervention.
All one can do is try, through objective analysis and hindsight, to understand the conclusions of Western prospective and strategic studies as well as their impact on future events. I have the most serious fears for the future of those Arab countries which took a courageous and bold stance in support of true international legitimacy and the defense of international law. These include Yemen, Palestine, Jordan and Algeria, who are already exposed to reprisals from within as well as from outside.
Having spread its hegemony over the region, the United States has achieved its purpose from the war. We should look into the attitude of some of our "intellectuals" who termed Arab popular reactions "sentimental, irrational, hasty and emotional." We now realize that they were either culturally alienated mercenaries, or that they were ignorant of the realities of their countries. Their attempts to justify the attitude of the West did not so much reflect their inability to perceive the dangers of the conspiracy as they laid bare their inability to understand the risks involved, let alone confront them.
You will soon notice reprisal campaigns against the populations which dared go out in the streets and strongly voice their outrage. Their move was considered quite disturbing. Whatever may happen, I remain both optimistic and confident as to the awareness and watchfulness of our peoples and our young generations who will no longer be so readily deceived.
To analyze past events, I should like to refer to an article which, to me, was one of the most important articles published during the Gulf crisis. It was published in "Time" magazine of January 18, 1991, by a prominent American commentator, Charles Krauthammer.
In this essay entitled "How the War Can Change America", we could read
the following :
"War is an exercise in surprise, and the real surprise of this one may be that it was not about Kuwait, not about Iraq, not even about the future of the Middle East... It may turn out to have been a war about America ...
"Except for revolution, nothing changes a country more than war ... If the war in the gulf ends the way it began - with a dazzling display of American technological superiority, individual grit and, most unexpectedly for Saddam, national resolve - we will no longer speak of post-Vietnam America. A new, post-gulf America will emerge, its self-image, sense of history, even its political discourse transformed."
The article's conclusion is even more amazing,
"Even if the war does turn out well, the postwar euphoria will eventually fade too. But it will leave something behind : a renewed America, self-confident and assured. That was, the legacy of the last good war, World War II, a legacy lost in the jungles of Vietnam."
The correlation between such paradoxical terms as "war" and "goodness" ("the first good war") "war" and "legitimacy," "war" and "justice" makes it easier to understand the article published on January 27, 1991 as well as later statements made by American officials regarding the overcoming of the Vietnam syndrome.
I wrote before the war that the United States would seek a military solution because of economic crisis and a Federal budget deficit of over 300 billion dollars. This is not a purely financial crisis, but an economic one as well, for several businesses, particularly banks and airline companies, have gone bankrupt. American society, for its part, is going through a self-confidence crisis due to political as well as moral reasons.
The situation is further compounded by other crises, involving labor unions, public health - owing to drug addiction and AIDS - youth problems, social integration as a result of endless fraud cases and large-scale scandals in which Bush's son and the children of several prominent American political and cultural personalities are involved.
Thus crises-ridden America is incapable of controlling the socio-economic (or post-industrial) struggle. Similarly, it fails to face up to Japan, financially as well as technologically, nor to the EEC in the agricultural field, which is vital for the United States, not only because it accounts for a sizeable share of the gross national product and has a considerable impact on voting, but also because it represents a major part of world food production and serves as a means of pressure in American foreign policy.
These American fears explain perhaps the course of events during GATT negotiations on international trade, which were expected to lead to a joint agreement at a meeting during the Gulf crisis. To prevent this, the United States imposed a kind of veto on Japan and on European countries. Having realized that it was no longer a superpower in the economic, scientific, political, civilizational and ideological fields, the United States had only one means left to defend itself: the military one. The United States earmarks 300 billion dollars annually for armament, at least that is what official statistics report. Only God knows the exact figure.
The Gulf event coincided with the end of what is known as the "cold war." In accordance with U.S.-Soviet agreements on disarmament, the U.S. Congress asked for major cuts in military spending. This was perceived, in some economic circles, as a risk and a threat for American military industry, which accounts for a major part of GNP. When the cold war era came to an end, following the successful initiatives of Reagan then Bush, the danger threatening world balance no longer existed. Thus, it became much easier, and less risky, to assert the reliability of new American military technologies (star wars). To actually achieve this, it was necessary to find a suitable battlefield in the world, preferably in the Third World.
Credibility is twofold: it is strategic and political, on one hand, and scientific and technological, on the other. We must keep in mind that many new weapons had never been used before. It was not realistic for Americans to use those weapons in a confrontation with the Soviet Union so long as they had not been tested beforehand. The Gulf crisis provided a suitable opportunity for that. Naturally, other domestic reasons are involved, which economist Nobel prizewinner Kenneth Galbraith calls "the industrial-military complex."(2)
Another reason is the correlation between the military sector and war, particularly that Gulf countries have the highest rates of expenditures on armament. During the last ten years, the Gulf region's spending on armament exceeded 150 billion dollars. It was necessary to destroy this armament so that Gulf countries could replenish their arsenals.
Similarly, Americans had to show the world that they have reached the acme of technological prowess and become capable of manufacturing unrivalled weapons, superior to those produced by English, French or Russian industries. Americans would thus have conquered new markets for their weapons and applied the necessary pressure to remain the unchallenged suppliers. The fact they used new weapons without heeding the risks involved is a clear indication of their determination to dominate the world.
A large number of Western countries and humanitarian organizations have
knowingly taken part in this crime, which is in fact an actual genocide.
When are we going to have humanitarian organizations which will protect
human beings--as they already do for animals--and fight, without discrimination,
against the use of those humans for experimentation purposes?
Let us now go back to some of the press communiqués published during the war. In the first day following the cease fire and the cessation of military hostilities, Dick Cheney and James Baker made separate statements. The latter clearly said that the Gulf war had erased the memory of the Vietnam defeat. Two days later, on March 1st, President Bush, in his first press conference after the end of military operations. thanked God for this day of celebration for America, a day in which the deadly symptoms of Vietnam were buried for ever. This statement, made by the chief person responsible for this armed conflict is a clear indication of his true motivations for starting the Gulf war.
However, new elements emerged. The main victim, both qualitatively and quantitatively, turned out to be Europe. Europe, and EEC countries in particular, realized how gullible they had been when they awoke to the fact they had lost outlets for their military industry to the United States, whose superiority became quite obvious. Europeans lost markets in the Gulf region but also in all Third World countries. Worse still, reconstruction of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other war-affected Gulf countries, estimated at about 100 billion dollars, was going to be a 90% American business. Even before the war started, some American companies were set up for the reconstruction of Kuwait. This is why I believe that Europe is the main loser in the war.
Of all European countries, it is France which suffered the most. It insisted on being the leading partner in the European coalition. I believe that even a president other than Mr. Mitterand would have had no alternative but to follow the United States, which applied all sorts of pressure. This became quite clear on January 14.
Indeed, there was a Soviet-French attempt at the Security Council to prevent war. American threats against France were such that France feared for its permanent membership in the Security Council. Poll results published by the French weekly magazine "L'Express" revealed that public opinion in many European countries no longer considered France as a superpower with enough weight to have any significant impact on international relations. This is the true defeat of Europe and France, although they tried to deny it by joining the United States in spreading lies, disguising facts and distorting the truth.
In return for its stance, France obtained a consolation prize: the green light to act as it sees fit in some regions such as "French-speaking" Africa, that is its former colonies. Since we now live in the post-colonial era, it is only natural for former colonizers to show their true face again. France also received delegation of authority over all regions it used to dominate, like the Maghreb for instance. The new element in the equation is that France unfolding its hegemonical designs on the Maghreb and applying for this purpose a more dangerous strategy than before the Gulf war.
Rabat, March 21, 1991
* Al Alam, Rabat, April 7, 1991.
2. 2Lecture given by Kenneth Galbraith, Second Commission of the United Nations General Assembly, 27 November 1990, New York.