17. THE AMERICAN REJECTION OF PEACE IS INEVITABLE *
(1)
 
 
 

Every American course of action has become foreseeable : the purpose of the war is hegemony. Even the behavior of Bush has turned into a sort of hysteria nourished by personal hatred for the Iraqi people and its President. As a professor of international relations, I fail to understand some of the expressions used by George Bush. White House officials call Saddam Hussein a "liar" and a "son of a bitch"; these words were used in the White House and reported in The Herald Tribune of February 18, 1991. When a Head of State uses such foul language, any political or economic analysis of the situation becomes extremely difficult. Psychiatric analysis could perhaps be more relevant.

There is still another factor, the Israeli government expressed the "hope" that the United States would "carefully" consider this initiative - meaning thereby that it ought to be rejected. The American decision seems therefore easily foreseeable. Furthermore, the President of the United States has asked the Congress to approve an additional $ 56 billion for the Gulf war, showing thereby his determination to continue the war.
 
 
 
 

THE EUROPEAN STANCE
 
 

To be sure, there are variations in the European stance. One can expect no peaceful move from the United Kingdom nor from France. London's blatant alignment on Washington is not surprising. The reaction of France, however, is less understandable even if it will lose regardless of the outcome of the situation, Mitterand is unable to break loose from the "consensus" imposed by the United States. As to Germany, it will be among the countries which will suffer most from the war, particularly now, after the reunification and after revealing its ambition to play an active economic role at European as well as world level.

I believe that the Gorbatchev-Kohl contacts might tip the balance in favor of a constructive German attitude towards the former's initiative (Helmut Kohl later confirmed this trend when he indicated that the Soviet move represented the last chance for peace, that is if earnest attempts are made to support it). Moreover, Germany has economic objectives in the USSR. Therefore, it would not be too unrealistic to expect a favorable German attitude towards the Soviet initiative.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

THE IRAQI POSITION

The Iraqi attitude regarding Gorbatchev's initiative seems to be a positive one. The problem, however, remains that of the American position. I do not think that the United States will accept a peaceful settlement, particularly if it is based on a Soviet initiative. The Americans will naturally think that the Soviets are trying to outsmart them, and this is unacceptable for them. In addition, there is the impact of American public opinion on Bush as President of the United States. Yet even this problem seems to be settled: Bush is today advocating American leadership in the world, and there is not a single American citizen ready to oppose him on this point.
 
 

PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONS

Similar cases exist in history, though the current situation is somewhat different. In 1956, when Great Britain, France and Israel intervened militarily in Egypt, the Soviet Union issued a strongly-worded warning and thus managed to put an end to the aggression. The important question is to know whether Gorbatchev is ready to defend his initiative or peace plan or is it simply a scenario to show a Soviet independent stand before ultimately changing his attitude..

I am afraid that the second assumption is more likely and that Gorbatchev will end up withdrawing his initiative as was the case, last January, with the French initiative, particularly that secret agreements on the Gulf may well have been concluded between Moscow and Washington.

We should also keep in mind that Gorbatchev has a great rival in Eltsine, who has asked the Soviet President to resign. This request could be connected to Western plans, particularly American ones, to prevent Gorbatchev from playing an important role which could run against Western ambitions.
 
 
 
 

February 19, 1991

(interview with "Al-Khabar" 48 hours before the publication of the official statement of the United States regarding the Soviet initiative).
 
 

* Al-Khabar, Algiers, Feb. 20, 1991

* Al-Alam, Rabat, Feb. 24, 1991

1. 1 February 1991.

Mahdi Elmandjra
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