What to
Do First : Israel or Iraq?
Doves tell President Bush to renew the Middle
East peace process before attacking Iraq. Hawks say that's a dangerous
distraction. Who's right, and who will win the debate
BY
TONY KARON
|

Caught in a trap: Bush faces conflicting
advice from his brain trust
|
 |
friday, Aug. 30, 2002
At its heart, the Republican fight about Iraq is also a battle about
Israel. GOP critics of a rush to military action say that if the Bush
administration is serious about going after Saddam, it had better push
Israel and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table first.
Advocates of a quick and decisive war counter that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict can't be resolved right now, and therefore
shouldn't be an obstacle to action, and, they say, the Middle East will
actually be safer without Saddam
around.
The argument from the GOP foreign policy old guard is based on the
premise that if the U.S. invades Iraq with no Arab allies in support,
the consequence could be a long-term violent backlash against American
interests throughout the Middle East, including the overthrow of pro-U.S.
governments by extremist elements. Also, they argue, Arab support may be
even more critical in the task of stabilizing a post-Saddam Iraq, which
could require a long-term occupation of the country by U.S. forces. But
the Arab allies that supported the U.S. in the Gulf War have rejected a
new attack on Iraq, and a recurring theme in their complaints is the
danger of a violent backlash sparked by a U.S. attack on an Arab country
while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains hot. U.S. mediation
between Israel and the Palestinians has become a litmus test among Arabs
of U.S. bona fides in the Middle East. That was the reason the first
Bush administration leaned heavily on the Israelis before and after the
Gulf War, threatening to cut funding if Israel persisted in expanding
its West Bank settlements and cajoling the Shamir government into
diplomatic negotiations with the Palestinians. Key architects of that
policy, such as former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and
former Secretary of State James Baker, have urged the current Bush
administration to follow suit.
Administration hawks, however, don't agree — and not simply because
they see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a dangerous distraction
from what they consider the priority of getting rid of Saddam Hussein (the
Old Guard tend to see Iraq as secondary to the war on al-Qaeda, and in
some cases, to securing peace between Israel and its neighbors).
Underlying the dispute are different views of how to conduct U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East in general, and in the
Israeli-Palestinian context in particular. It's not coincidental that
Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and other strong
advocates of invading Iraq are also among the administration's most
vocal critics of the notion of applying any pressure on Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon to resume dialogue with the Palestinians. Neither is there
any surprise that the voices of caution, such as Secretary of State
Colin Powell, have also been those that have advocated accelerating
negotiations towards Palestinian statehood.
The "Old Guard" view associated with Powell, Baker and Scowcroft sees
the U.S. interest in the Middle East as necessarily balanced between
Israel and Arab allies, and that the conflict between those competing
interests would be best resolved through a territorial compromise that
separates Israel and the Palestinians along a modified version of
Israel's 1967 borders, creating a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza. The view associated with Cheney, Rumsfeld and others is skeptical
about the wisdom of Israel ceding the West Bank, suggesting that the
territory remains indispensable to the country's ability to defend
itself. They tend to see the continuation of a low-intensity war between
Israel and the Palestinians as representing little threat to U.S.
interests or regional stability, and like Sharon and Bibi Netanyahu, the
Bush administration hawks tend to reject the very premise of the Oslo
Accords. They have persuaded President Bush to adopt a policy that
requires the remaking of Palestinian politics on terms more acceptable
to the U.S. and Israel as a precondition for political dialogue.
Replacing Saddam with a pro-Western leadership, some hawks suggest,
could profoundly alter the current power equation throughout the Middle
East, affecting everything from America's access to oil supplies to its
ability to press the Palestinians to accept Israel's terms for peace.
The prospect of a new Pax Americana in the Middle East generates
little enthusiasm among Arab leaders across the political spectrum,
however, and concern over their ability to manage the domestic political
backlash against a U.S. attack on Iraq has prompted them to declare
their opposition. Both Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and the Saudis
have emphasized the need for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front
before any action on Iraq could even be considered. If Powell and the
Old Guard prevail over the hawks in the battle for President Bush's ear,
he is unlikely to go to war in Iraq before assembling a broad coalition.
And the building of such a coalition, as it did in 1991, is likely
require pressure on Israel to both halt settlement activity and to
resume dialogue with the Palestinians. But Sharon is showing little
inclination to respond to new peace initiatives that involve confronting
settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. And he knows that the domestic
politics of an election year all but preclude Washington from nudging
him back towards talking to the Palestinians. Triangulating the
positions of the Israelis, the Arabs and Capitol Hill suggest
coalition-building could be a long and arduous process, one hardly
conducive to quick action against Saddam.
Then again, the counsel from the hawkish camp is that the U.S. should
begin moving ahead, alone if necessary, and the allies will have no
choice but to fall into step, making the decision by "leadership rather
than consensus," as Rumsfeld puts it. That's a far simpler and more
decisive course to chart right now. But the Old Guard warns that it
carries far more dangers. And so the debate continues. |